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Definitions of Suicidal Behavior
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Abstract. Based on the experience matured during the 15 years of the WHO/EURO Multicentre Study on Suicidal Behavior, this paper
provides an excursus on main elements that characterize components for definitional needs. It describes the rationale for choosing the
initial set of definitions within the study and the subsequent problems and developments. As a result, unifying terminologies are proposed.
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Introduction
Since 1903, when the first “International Classification of
Diseases and Causes of Death” was adopted, suicide has
been included in the section dealing with morbidity and
mortality from external causes. Reading through the pro-
ceedings of the various international conferences to update
that classification (roughly every 10 years, until 1994), as
discussed by Shneidman (1984), it becomes clear that sui-
cide is a “residual mode,” to be used when the other ones
could not be confirmed. The other modes are: Natural (N),
accidental (A) and homicidal (H), together constituting the
NASH system,
From 1903 until 1948, all pertinent categories were clas-
sified under “Conditions produced by external causes” by
the means used and phrased as “suicide due to . . ..” From
1948 on (ICD-6) and until 1965 (ICD-8), the section was
named “Accidents, poisoning and violence,” and the perti-
nent category was renamed “suicide and self-inflicted in-
jury.” ICD-9, in 1975, named the section “Injury and poi-
soning” and the category was named “Suicide”; a note ex-
plained that it included “suicide attempts; and purposefully
self-inflicted injuries.” ICD-10 (1992) created a category
of “Intentional Self-Harm” explaining that it included “pur-
posefully self-inflicted poisoning or injury; and suicide (at-
tempted).”
In 1964 Stengel proposed that suicide and suicide at-
tempt referred to two distinct populations. However, strict-
ly speaking, a “true” suicide attempt should refer only to
those who failed to die after having tried to kill themselves.
A tentative attempt to overcome this semantic and concep-
tual snag was the introduction of the expression “suicidal
behavior.” This expression, which clearly stems from the
behavioral approach predominant in North American psy-
chology, was a “politically correct” move brought forward
by feminist scholars who objected to the supposed bias
conveyed by the use of “attempt,” mostly seen among
women, and implying that women were less competent
than men (among which “completed” suicide was more fre-
quent) in “completing” that act (Lester, 1994).
From a logic perspective, the crucial elements to differ-
entiate between suicidal, accidental or homicidal acts (as
possible external causes of death, distinct from those from
natural causes) are actually two: (1) the locus of origin
(self-initiated) and (2) the intention (to cause, or not to
cause, death). The outcome, death or injury or nothing, is
clearly the result of these; the visible phenomenon is of a
more immediate interest to health staff, particularly those
working in emergency care settings.
In practice, suicide attempts, when serious enough to
need medical attention (and the majority of these acts are
not, and remain unknown to medical authorities) are mostly
cared for at emergency rooms. In those places staff are or-
dinarily much more concerned with the nature of the injury
or intoxication than with the intention at the origin (or
cause) of that injury or intoxication. The medical or surgi-
cal need is tended for and once this cleared, the patient is
either discharged (in the majority of the cases) or referred
to further assessment and follow-up (which, in a minority
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of cases involves mental health staff). Under these circum-
stances, the diagnosis recorded will reflect the nature of the
injury or intoxication, while medical staff does not inves-
tigate the intention behind the act. Depending on the juris-
diction, in all cases of nonnatural death, an investigation is
conducted by justice or police.
As a consequence of these practices, most countries
have national systems to record, collect, and process in-
formation related to suicides (mortality registers) on a
permanent basis, but so far no country has an equivalent
system specific for suicide attempts (morbidity registers).
In a few cases, there are similar registers for injuries and
for intoxications, however, few of them reference inten-
tionality, which would allow for a distinction between
accidental, criminal, or self-inflicted injuries or intoxica-
tion.
The current public health approach, as indicated by ICD-
10, is to group all intentional self-harm activities, and use
this broad category in the context of both morbidity and
mortality. It has the great advantage of being rather descrip-
tive and of avoiding value-loaded terms such as suicide and
suicide attempt. However, the assessment of intentionality
remains a crucial issue, which not only impacts heavily on
sanitary matters but has also legal and criminological im-
plications.
In this paper we accompany the reader through the many
existing problems endemic to the field of suicide and at-
tempted suicide nomenclature, trying to explain why these
perennially dissatisfy researchers and clinicians. Supported
by the experience matured within 15 years of the WHO/
EURO Multicentre Study on Parasuicide (Kerkhof,
Schmidtke, Bille-Brahe, De Leo, & Lonnqvist, 1994), we
examine a number of definitional issues that normally com-
plicate the understanding of suicidal behaviors, and even-
tually obstruct the progress of suicide research and its log-
ical outcome, suicide prevention.
Suicide mortality was not the main focus of the
WHO/EURO study. The priority was instead suicide mor-
bidity (attempted suicides), and this was a result of the
alarmingly increasing trends that were affecting Europe
during the 1980s. The possible role of attempts as precur-
sor/predictor of subsequent completed suicides was, of
course, the ultimate justification for performing the study.
Although in common use and routinely accepted by
WHO, in suicidology “mortality/morbidity” emphasizes
in an inappropriate way the disease model that is implicit
in the use of this terminology. Suicide is a behavior and
not an illness; in addition, in most cases suicide attempts
represent a kind of “spurious” morbidity, and those who
attempt suicide have no intention to die at all, but just want
to manipulate their environment. Once more, the role of
intention(s) is of critical importance in the clinical/scien-
tific appraisal of suicidal and suicided persons. In this
light, it will be of interest to know how the WHO/EURO
study group dealt with these issues and what are the out-
comes of such a long, cooperative effort in the definitional
domain.
The Importance of Consistent
Definitions to Different Professional
Domains
Each person intuitively knows what he or she means when
the topic of suicide arises in everyday conversation. How-
ever, the definition of suicide is inherently more complex
than the simple words “killing oneself.” Although it is
doubtful that we will ever be able to construct universally
unambiguous criteria to comprehensively characterize sui-
cidal behaviors (and, overall, firmly establish the intention
behind them), for scientific clarity it would be highly de-
sirable that the set of definitions and the associated termi-
nology be explicit and generalizable.
A large part of the difficulty in defining suicidal behav-
ior comes from the broad spectrum of outcomes that this
term is currently used to describe. Fatal suicidal behavior
tends to have societal, clinical, and demographic character-
istics that are quite distinct from those of nonfatal suicidal
behavior, and this has led to the adoption of a range of terms
to try to encompass these differences. The intention to die
constitutes an important distinction in many cases and this
has prompted the use of alternative terminology, such as in
the case of “parasuicide” adopted in the WHO/EURO
study.
Terminology and definitions are the two elements that
constitute a standard nomenclature (O’Carroll, Berman,
Maris, Moscicki, Tanney, & Silverman, 1996), and it is in
both of these areas that suicidology is currently confusing.
A satisfactory nomenclature of suicide should be applica-
ble and usable both within and across all domains in which
it is to be employed, whether the focus is research, clinical
practice, public health, politics, or law.
It is argued that inconsistent definitions of variables pose
real-world problems. For suicide, these problems emerge
in three principal areas: (1) public health (certification of
death and calculation of mortality rates), (2) research, and
(3) and clinical practice. As detailed below, each of these
domains has different reasons for needing a standard defi-
nition of suicide and consequently, differing applications
for the definition.
Discussions regarding a lack of consistency in terminol-
ogy and definitions for suicidology have predominantly
centered on the possibility that suicide mortality rates are
over- or underestimated regionally, nationally, and interna-
tionally (Barraclough, Holding, & Fayers, 1976; O’Carroll,
1989). Cultural and sociodemographic differences provide
important clues regarding the propensity to suicide in dif-
ferent populations. The accuracy of the information gath-
ered is crucial to quantifying these trends.
The process of death certification has been flagged as
one area in which biases can influence mortality rates. It is
often unclear whether the death was self-inflicted, and it is
even more complicated to determine post hoc what was
intended (O’Carroll, 1989). Cases of suicide are, therefore,
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not always clear-cut, there is often assumption and guess-
work involved, and without a consistent set of criteria for
determining suicides versus what should be classified as
accidental or homicidal, the guesswork involved is magni-
fied.
In addition, there are numerous pressures on profes-
sionals that may influence appraisals, including societal
and religious prejudices, and the expected impact of a sui-
cide verdict on the victim’s family (Barraclough et al.,
1976; Schneidman, 1981). Alleviating the distress and
feelings of guilt for survivors, allowing widows to collect
their husband’s life insurance money, the possibility of the
suicide not being buried with full religious rites, and reli-
gious beliefs that suicide is a sin leading the family of a
suicide victim to be shunned from the community, may
each be seen as good reasons for not arriving at a true
verdict (De Leo, Bertolote, & Lester, 2002). Consequent-
ly, much research effort has been devoted to examining
the consistency with which coroners, pathologists, and
other officials involved in cause of death identification
make their decisions.
One of the very few international comparisons on death
certification procedures specifically in relation to suicide
was concluded in 1974 under the auspices of the WHO, and
looked at both the variations between countries and be-
tween certifying authorities (Brooke & Atkinson, 1974).
Results of the questionnaire, which was completed by of-
ficials in 24 participating countries, suggested that as ele-
ments of the classification process differ, so too will suicide
statistics. The main areas of variation between countries
were found in the qualifications of the officials involved,
level of appointment and supervision, the additional inqui-
ries undertaken, examinations and autopsies conducted,
tools available in the fact-finding process, and the way in
which the decision is recorded and information subsequent-
ly stored. All of these differences summated to the conclu-
sion that there is considerable international variation in
classifying a death as suicide. Just as standard definitions
of diseases are effective in improving the consistency of
diagnoses and comparability of incidence rates for that dis-
ease, the authors recommended that a standard definition
would contribute to standardizing the classification of sui-
cides and to reducing biases evident in mortality rates.
Other researchers have focused on international compar-
isons of suicide rates. For example, Sainsbury and Barra-
clough (1968) measured the suicide rates of immigrants to
the United States and demonstrated that these were in the
same rank order as the rates reported in their country of
origin. More recently, Lester (1992) conducted a compari-
son of the suicide rates of 15 countries with the rates for
undetermined and accidental deaths, to establish whether
discrepancies could account for between-country differ-
ences in rates. This analysis revealed few differences and
Lester concluded that although miscounting may occur, it
is unlikely to constitute a problem of a magnitude that
would impact rates adversely.
Further investigating the accuracy of suicide mortality
rates, county or within-country comparisons of suicide
classifications have been conducted. These studies tend to
evidence a consistency in verdicts despite the lack of a
common definition, and this persists both across regions
and countries (Barraclough et al., 1976; Sainsbury & Jen-
kins, 1982). For example, Farberow and colleagues (1977)
examined coroners’ offices in 191 counties in the United
States to determine whether the between region variation
in suicide rates resulted from characteristics of the coro-
ners’ offices rather than real differences in rates. They
found that in the larger counties biases introduced by offi-
cials had less impact than for the smaller counties. Taken
together, these findings suggest that despite fears that sui-
cide mortality rates are, at least partially, socially manufac-
tured, this is not so far-reaching as to invalidate official
statistics.
A WHO working group convened in 1981 to determine
the validity and reliability of studying trends in suicidal
behavior. After examining the findings cited above and oth-
er similar studies, they concluded that there are true differ-
ences operating, and that continuing to collate official sui-
cide data and examine relative differences between rates is
worthwhile. Though they expressed a sufficient degree of
confidence in mortality statistics, the group recommended
persistence in considering and analyzing suspected biases,
and advocated the benefits that a standard nomenclature for
suicide would have for this area (WHO, 1982).
Overall, the existing research paints a generally promis-
ing picture regarding the validity and reliability of suicide
statistics. This said, we must remember that however small
the effect, any bias is potentially damaging. Adopting a
standard definition of suicide and suicidal behaviors will
have a clear positive impact for the legal domain, reducing
error and increasing the accuracy of suicide mortality rates.
In turn, the correct determination of suicide deaths contrib-
utes to an understanding of the risk factors surrounding sui-
cide through the direction of research and targeting high-
risk groups (Rosenberg et al., 1988).
Even more so than for fatal behaviors, morbidity statis-
tics counting nonfatal suicidal behaviors are seen as inher-
ently containing error, and as only “estimates” of the real
situation. Unlike suicidal behavior that ends in death, there
are numerous physical outcomes and degrees (and types)
of intention that are associated with nonfatal suicidal be-
havior. This adds to the complexity of calculating incidence
rates and heightens the importance of consistent defini-
tions. In compiling statistical information, the following
categories have usually been adopted:
– Admissions – The number of times a case is admitted to
a heath care unit, regardless of the number of admissions
of the same case in a single year.
– Patients – Each case is counted once only, regardless of
how many admissions there were in that given year.
– First-ever attempts – Cases are counted only once at the
time of their first attempt (WHO, 1982).
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However, whether or not a case is counted depends on
whether or not they present to a health care professional
following their attempt.
Research in suicidology is a second area plagued by ex-
isting definitional obfuscation (Smith & Maris, 1995). In a
recent review, Santa Mina and Gallop (1998) highlight the
pervasive absence of definitional consistency and the im-
pact of this deficiency on research, reporting that the ma-
jority of studies lack clear definitions of terminology used.
Other reviewers have reported similar findings; for exam-
ple, in each study reviewed by Ivanoff (1989) an idiosyn-
cratic definition was employed. Most notably, this lack of
consistent definitions contributes to a lack of comparability
between studies (Linehan, 1997). Therefore, because sui-
cidal behavior is a complex phenomenon, and there are nu-
merous subtypes of suicidal acts, an additional element of
complexity is added to the problem.
Thirdly, in a clinical setting clarity of terminology is es-
sential to precise assessment, documentation of symptoma-
tology, and communication about patients between profes-
sionals. Measures of suicidality cannot be valid or reliable
if they are not appropriately or consistently defined (Mue-
hrer, 1995; O’Carroll et al., 1996). A lack of standard no-
menclature is, therefore, detrimental to clinical practice in
the application of studies on treatment effectiveness and
risk assessment (Rudd, 1997). The treatment chosen may
not prove effective or relevant for a particular patient if
their characteristics differ in a significant way from those
of the sample utilized in development of the treatment. This
leaves open the dangerous likelihood of relapse into the
suicidal crisis. Similar, and perhaps more serious, is the
importance of a consistent set of terms and definitions to
risk assessment. In this case it is possible that a client will
be wrongly assessed at a low level of risk, and such clinical
misjudgments may end fatally.
In terms of the outcomes of interventions, realizing the
aims of effective clinical intervention and preventative
campaigns is impossible without a solid definitional foun-
dation. Silverman and Maris (1995) note that for interven-
tions to be successful the extent of the problem must first
be clarified, as well as the target group, and then treatment
and delivery strategies must be developed. Overall, consis-
tent and clear definitions provide a strong basis for the de-
velopment and provision of effective clinical care (Rudd,
1997).
Historical Definitions of Suicide1
The word “suicide” was first introduced in the 17th century,
said to be derived from the Latin words sui (of oneself) and
caedere (to kill). Apparently, Sir Thomas Browne – a phy-
sician and a philosopher – was the first to coin the term
suicide in his Religio Medici (1642). The new word reflect-
ed a desire to distinguish between the homicide of oneself
and the killing of another (Minois, 1999).
The conceptualization of suicide has changed through-
out history with popular perception, and this has shaped
what is currently defined as suicide. In antiquity and the
early Roman culture mors voluntaris was not only accepted
but at times recommended. It has to be noted, however, that
especially in Rome, the rules were in force only for free
citizens, i.e., slaves were not allowed to kill themselves (if
a newly bought slave killed himself, the new owner was
entitled to have his money back!).
A first important cultural shift happened with the com-
ing of Christianity and the increasing numbers of martyrs
(the so-called “Donatists”), who turned out to be a more
serious threat to the young Christian community than the
cruelest persecution by the Romans. As Alvarez wrote: “It
culminated in the genuine lunacy of the Donatists, whose
lust for martyrdom was so extreme that the Church even-
tually declared them heretics” (Alvarez, 1972). In fact, in
348 AD the Council of Carthage condemned voluntary
death for the first time in history because of Donatism,
which praised the practice (Minois, 1999). After the Coun-
cil of Arles, in 452 AD, the Church also condemned the
suicide of all famuli (slaves and domestic servants), giving
ground to procedures such as the confiscation of all goods
of the suicided person.
This negative view continued, spurred by both law and
religious influence, and the Councils of Braga (563) and
Auxerre (578) ended by condemning all types of suicide
and forbidding commemorative offerings and masses for
suicides (Minois, 1999). Harsh penalties for suicides and
their families existed during the Middle Ages. Suicide was
viewed as a criminal act and those who attempted suicide
were placed on trial. Courts of the time distinguished be-
tween two verdicts, non compos mentis for the innocent
madman, and felo de se for those “felons of themselves”
judged to be in violation of the laws of God and man (Mac-
Donald, 1989). However, the popular conception of suicide
shifted progressively away from criminality. Influential
thinkers such as Emile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud led
to an emphasis on the impact of external influences and the
embrace of a more sociological and psychological concept
of suicide. Since then, there have been many attempts to
reach a consensus on the definition of suicide (see Table
1), yet, thus far, there is little agreement on what aspects
are important for inclusion in a definition of suicide.
A number of common key aspects emerge from these def-
initions: The outcome of the behavior, the agency of the act,
the intention to die or stop living in order to achieve a differ-
ent status, the consciousness/awareness of the outcomes. In
addition, two important conceptual issues emerge, namely,
the impact of a theoretical orientation and of cultural influ-
ences. The cross-cultural design of the WHO/EURO Multi-
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centre Study heightened the importance of these characteris-
tics of the definition. Numerous suicidologists from varied
backgrounds constituted the group responsible for imple-
menting this project; the definition settled on must have re-
flected and allowed for this diversity. In the same vein, retain-
ing a culturally neutral definition served to facilitate the in-
tended international comparisons.
Some of the differences in the definitions outlined in
Table 1 stem from the distinct theoretical approaches of the
authors. For example, Durkheim’s (1897/1951) character-
ization of suicide is sociological; this is distinct from that
of Shneidman (1985) who focuses on the psychological di-
mension, and Baechler (1980) who emphasizes the existen-
tial one (Maris, Berman, & Silverman, 2000). The theoret-
ical perspective explains the basis of the behavior. Howev-
er, definitions are a description of the concept rather than
an explanation, and should not be guided by theory (Maris
et al., 2000). A similar approach guided the choices of the
WHO Working Group: A theoretical basis for the definition
of suicide should have not been the driving force, as for at
least two reasons it could have actually hindered the goal
of communication. First, those not adhering to the particu-
lar theoretical perspective would have been less likely to
accept the definition. In fact, for a nomenclature to be use-
able, it must be applicable across all theoretical perspec-
tives. Second, if the theory is superseded, or becomes less
popular, then the definition also becomes obsolete and the
desired definitional consistency is disrupted. The most
valuable definition is, thus, one that is theory neutral.
Similarly, a definition for suicide should also be free of
value judgment and remain culturally normative. Both of
these characteristics serve to facilitate effective and precise
communication. Exemplary of such value judgments is, for
example, the German word for suicide, Selbstmord, which
translates literally to “self-murder” (the same holds true for
Scandinavian countries). If suicide is defined as a crime, or
as immoral, then the way toward unbiased discussion and
research practice is impeded (Mayo, 1992). Cultural differ-
ences can also imbue a definition of suicide with a value
judgment. For example, Stack (1996) explains that in the
Japanese culture, suicidal behavior is generally accepted,
particularly in the face of shame. Such cultural differences
in the attitudes toward suicidal acts clearly question the
adequacy of a universal definition. A workable solution is
retaining a culturally normative definition for suicide. This
should be broad enough so as to be applicable to a range
of belief systems and, concurrently, specific enough to give
an adequate description of the characteristics involved.
The WHO Working Group proposed to adopt a standard
definition to be implemented in each site for the study in
an attempt to take these issues into consideration. The def-
inition of suicide adopted was as follows:
Suicide is an act with a fatal outcome which the deceased,
knowing or expecting a fatal outcome had initiated and carried
out with the purpose of provoking the changes he desired
(WHO/EURO, 1986).
As stated in the Introduction, the central focus of the
WHO/EURO Multicenter Study on Parasuicide (the initial
name of the study) was the incidence of nonfatal suicidal
behavior. The task of the group was now to expand the
definition to include nonlethal counterpart behaviors while
retaining the link between fatal and nonfatal suicidal acts
and the characteristics established in this definition of sui-
cide. The primary difficulty in successfully achieving this
goal revolved around the intentions behind the act. That is,
not all attempts to suicide are failed suicides, there are
probably many more cases that are manipulative or an at-
tempt to seek attention (Bille-Brahe, Schmidtke, Kerkhof,
De Leo, Lonnqvist, Platt, & Sampaio Faria, 1995). The way
that intentions were dealt with is a unique characteristic of
the Working Group’s definition of “parasuicide,” a term
first introduced by Kreitman in 1969. For the purposes of
the study, parasuicide was delineated as:
An act with a nonfatal outcome in which an individual delib-
erately initiates a non-habitual behavior that, without interven-
tion from others, will cause self-harm, or deliberately ingests
a substance in excess of the prescribed or generally recognized
therapeutic dosage, and which is aimed at realizing changes
which the subject desired, via the actual or expected physical
consequences (WHO/EURO, 1986).
There were a number of advantages and disadvantages as-
sociated with acceptance of the term parasuicide. As Bille-
“All cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a posi-
tive or negative act of the of the victim himself, which he
knows will produce this result” (Durkheim, 1897/1951).
“All behavior that seeks and finds the solution to an existential
problem by making an attempt on the life of the subject”
(Baechler, 1980).
“Suicide is a conscious act of self-induced annihilation, best
understood as a multidimensional malaise in a needful individ-
ual who defines an issue for which suicide is perceived as the
best solution” (Shneidman, 1985).
“Death arising from an act inflicted upon oneself with the in-
tention to kill oneself” (Rosenberg et al, 1988).
“Self-initiated, intentional death” (Ivanoff, 1989).
“The definition of suicide has four elements: (1) a suicide has
taken place if death occurs; (2) it must be of one’s own doing;
(3) the agency of suicide can be active or passive; (4) it implies
intentionally ending one’s own life” (Mayo, 1992).
“Suicide is, by definition, not a disease, but a death that is
caused by a self-inflicted intentional action or behavior” (Sil-
verman & Maris, 1995).
“The act of killing oneself deliberately initiated and performed
by the person concerned in the full knowledge or expectation
of its fatal outcome” (WHO, 1998).
Table 1. Frequently reported definitions of suicide
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Brahe, Schmidtke, Kerkhof, De Leo, Lonnqvist, & Platt
(1994) describe, there are at least four ways in which the
term has been used in practice:
1. Parasuicide is a subcategory of attempted suicide char-
acterized by low levels of intention to die. This perspec-
tive is favored in America.
2. Attempted suicide is a more specific subcategory of
parasuicide characterized by a strong intention to die.
This perspective is favored in Europe.
3. Parasuicide and attempted suicide are mutually exclu-
sive, the former describing cases with low suicidal in-
tent, and the latter used to label cases where the intent
to die is clearly evident.
4. Parasuicide and attempted suicide are used interchange-
ably, recognizing the difficulties inherent in ascertaining
intent.
The WHO/EURO Group favored the fourth interpretation
of the term, and expected that this would go a long way
toward solving the definitional problems that were current-
ly facing the area. This was appealing for three reasons:
First, because of the lack of implication regarding intent, it
remained easy to operationalize; second, it did not restrict
the classification of cases on the basis of physical conse-
quences; and third, it retained the link between nonfatal
suicidal behavior and suicide (Bille Brahe et al., 1994).
As the study progressed, the disadvantages of the term
became more apparent. In addition to the confusion it created
in both research and clinical practice, the term parasuicide
appeared to be plagued by semantic difficulties, not being
easily translatable into other languages (Bille-Brahe et al.,
1994). To begin with, the prefix para causes problems: In
several languages it means “similar to” or “resembling to,”
but also means “mimicking,” “pretending;” a fact that is not
true of all nonfatal suicidal behaviors. The nature of this term
seems to address quite well those acts with no intention to die,
but not very well what is commonly known as “failed sui-
cide,” where the intention to die was present but for reasons
outside the control of the individual, the attempt at death was
thwarted.
In choosing and defining a term, desirable and undesir-
able connotations must be considered. For example, the
verbs “ commit” and “attempt” are often paired with “sui-
cide,” adding a value judgment of wrongdoing or failure to
the act. Such connotations impede the path of unbiased dis-
cussion and research practice (Egel, 1999). Substitute ter-
minology that labels the act by the method, such as “self-
poisoning” or “self-cutting,” represents the official interna-
tional approach since 1903, well before WHO was created,
and applies to both suicide and attempted suicide. Howev-
er, habitual or self-mutilating behaviors encompassed in
this terminology are distinct from suicidal acts, and it
would be desirable that this be reflected in definitions and
terms used to depict suicidal behavior (Suyemoto, 1998).
The more generic “self-harm” (particularly popular in
UK, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand) does not
seem appropriate because it has been broadened in com-
mon usage to cover other behavior patterns that have noth-
ing to do with suicidal behavior, thus inevitably implying
the absence of an intention to die (Linehan, 1997). In ad-
dition, in the words of Kreitman: “Terms such as deliberate
self-harm, self-injury, or self-poisoning . . . neglect the very
real association that exists between attempted suicide and
completed suicide” (Kreitman, Philip, Greer, & Bagley,
1969).
By 1994 the WHO Group had realized the extent of the
problems associated with the term parasuicide, and this coin-
cided with the publication of the first book on the study with
“attempted suicide” rather than “parasuicide” in the title
(Kerkhof et al., 1994). Actually the subtitle of the volume also
contained the term “parasuicide,” and this was a way of both
acknowledging the inherent difficulties in adopting a stan-
dardized terminology and promoting the interchangeability
of the two terms, as suggested by the Steering Group of the
study. A few years later, in 1999, the group embraced an
outcome-based orientation to the definitions as a solution to
these problems, proposing the use of the terms “fatal” and
“nonfatal” suicidal behavior (De Leo, Bertolote, Schmidtke,
Bille-Brahe, & Kerkhof, 1999). This encompasses the act
while also respecting that intention is not necessarily always
present. In acknowledgment of the increasingly evident dif-
ficulties related to the term parasuicide, the WHO/EURO
Multicenter Study on Parasuicide was formally renamed to
the WHO/EURO Multicenter Study on Suicidal Behavior.
The assembly of principal investigators of the study ratified
the change on November 11, 1999, immediately after the
20th World Congress of the International Association for Sui-
cide Prevention in Athens.
Constructing a Definition of Suicide
As underlined by Mayo (1992, pp. 92), “a suicide has taken
place if death occurs.” A dead body, that is, the fatal out-
come of the action or behavior, is the first element that
incontrovertibly qualifies all definitions of suicide. At the
same time, this kind of outcome creates a neat separation
from all other behaviors not ending in death, the outcome
of which is, thus, nonfatal. The WHO/EURO definition of
suicide reported above started with this essential element:
“Suicide is an act with fatal outcome.”
Agency of the act resulting in suicide is also an element
common to many definitions. For example, all definitions
listed in Table 1 specify that the subject instigated the act
resulting in the end of his or her own life. This tends to be
worded in two distinct ways: That the act is either self-ini-
tiated or self-inflicted. The first implies that the subject in-
stigated but not necessarily carried out the behavior, while
the second suggests that the subject both initiated and con-
ducted the act. This is an important distinction, because
expressions of the second type exclude cases of what has
been termed “hetero-suicide,” in which the suicide victim
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dies by another’s hand (Mohandie & Meloy, 2000). Al-
though it is more frequently the case that the suicidal sub-
ject is also the one who engages in the suicidal act, this is
not the aspect of agency that is most relevant to a definition
of suicide.
As Durkheim’s (1897/1951) definition specifies (see Ta-
ble 1), the act undertaken by the subject to achieve death
may be direct or indirect, active or passive. A direct or
active act is one in which the deceased was also the agent
of their death, the one who, for example, swallowed the
pills or pulled the trigger. An indirect or passive suicide
would involve some inaction on the victim’s part, such as
failing to move out of the path of an oncoming vehicle, or
failing to comply with police instructions in order to avoid
the use of deadly force (“suicide by cop”). Hence, it seems
that the most important element of agency in relation to
suicidal acts is the responsibility for the outcome, not the
performance of the behavior, and we can conclude that sui-
cide should be defined as an act that is self-initiated.
However, responsibility for the act is not sufficient to
distinguish suicide from other behaviors. There are many
other acts that are self-initiated and potentially fatal, such
as self-harm and habitual behaviors, which are clearly dis-
tinct from suicide. In particular, self-harm is a broad cate-
gory, often used to describe situations ranging from sub-
stance abuse, eating disorders, and reckless behavior to mu-
tilation and nonfatal suicidal acts (Santa Mina & Gallop,
1998). In addition, self-mutilation is often repetitive and
habitual. Such behaviors do not have the intentions of sui-
cidal behaviors and, thus, are qualitatively different (Bille
Brahe et al., 1995). Self-harm may also be differentiated
from suicidal acts in terms of the way in which the individ-
ual perceives the act, and the function that the act serves
for the individual (Suyemoto, 1998). These would not po-
tentially lead to eventual suicide, and death as a result of
these behaviors would be classed as accidental, not suicid-
al. For these reasons self-harming acts that are habitual
should be excluded from a definition of suicide and suicidal
acts.
Intent to die or stop living is a characteristic that distin-
guishes suicide from habitual and manipulative behaviors,
and should be considered for inclusion in a definition of
suicidal behavior. Without consideration of the individual’s
intention, suicide cannot be easily distinguished from an
accident. Suicidal intent, or intent to die, constitutes the
second criteria for determination of death by suicide ac-
cording to the “Operational Criteria for the Determination
of Suicide” (OCDS: Rosenberg et al., 1988), and is also a
key element in many other definitions of suicide (see Table
1). This is perhaps the most contentious aspect of the defi-
nitional debate on suicide and nonfatal suicidal behaviors.
The inclusion of intent to die can determine the scope and
applicability of a definition for suicide. If intent is judged
to be important, the definition risks being too narrow: Not
everyone who suicides seeks death. On the other hand, if
intent is absent from a definition then it is too broad and
does not exclude self-injurious and repetitive behaviors
(Allen, 2000). The fact that intention is included in defini-
tions such as those in Table 1 has received much criticism,
and the interpretive nature of this construct has lead to nu-
merous problems, including operational and assessment
difficulties.
In particular, definitions of suicide that include intent
have been criticized for being nonscientific. Egel outlines
the criteria for scientific definitions and claims that suicide,
at present, does not meet these:
“The bedrock of scientific method is that (1) what there is can
be experienced, (2) what there is can be described in a hypo-
thetical form sentence, and (3) whatever is the consequent of
an event hypothesis must be observable” (Egel, 1999, pp. 393).
The intentions of the suicidal individual do not meet the
third criteria because they are not directly observable (Egel,
1999). In addition, they can be falsified. What is intended
by a suicidal act remains in the mind of the individual. If
the act has a fatal outcome, then we are left to infer what
was intended, unless a suicide note is found. If the act has
a nonfatal outcome, we may ask the individual what they
meant, but this is associated with pitfalls, too. Memory is
not infallible and is filtered through one’s interpretation.
This is especially true of those emotionally charged mem-
ories often connected with a suicidal crisis. Furthermore,
suicide attempters may deliberately deny or minimize their
previous intentions.
Given that assessment of suicidal intent requires inter-
pretation, which is often from an outsider’s perspective, it
has been labeled vague and, thus, not easily measurable
(Mayo, 1992). There are a number of additional reasons
why “intentional” may represent an unsatisfactory term.
First, it entails an element of degree, and, thus, remains to
be qualified (Mayo, 1992). It relates to the ever-prevalent
ambivalence surrounding death by suicide (Maris et al.
2000). Shneidman (1981, pp. 206) argues that the “proto-
typical psychological picture of a person on the brink of
suicide is one who wants to and does not want to.” This is
also in line with Freudian theory, which suggests that with-
in an individual, life and death wishes co-exist to varying
degrees. In this context, the question should be raised re-
garding how much more must the suicidal subject wish for
death rather than life, in order for their death to be classified
as a suicide. For example, if quantification were possible,
do we distinguish between a suicide who wished for death
51% of the time and life 49% of the time, and another
whose wishes balanced at 99% to 1% (Maris et al., 2000)?
The suicidal individual is rarely 100% intent on dying,
therefore, it would be more accurate to assert that he or she
does not want to die, but death is just a more appealing
option than living.
The corresponding fact that there is not simply one type
of intention, that there may be any number and quality of
intentions within a single person at any time (Mayo, 1992),
is a second reason that “intentional” has been criticized as
vague and imprecise terminology. Definitions of suicidal
phenomena typically do not include a specification of what
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intentions are being spoken of, simply stating that the act
was intentional. On other occasions they may focus on the
subject’s intent to die; yet both of these may be somewhat
misleading. Intent relates to the goals that an individual has
in using a certain method to achieve a particular result (Ma-
ris et al., 2000). Thus, although the action is intentional, it
need not be interpreted as the goal. Suicidal intent is also
not equivalent to the physical outcome of suicidal acts.
That is, not all suicide survivors desired to live and not all
suicidal deaths were intended (Canetto & Lester, 1995).
From a psychological perspective the most important as-
pect of suicide is not death. Shneidman (1985) defines the
intention at the core of suicide as the intent to cease, noting
that suicide is more about ending suffering than death.
From this perspective suicide is associated with the inten-
tion to achieve cessation of suffering using death as the
means. The ultimate goal is to stop future consciousness of
ongoing suffering.
In many cases, intention “to cease suffering” distin-
guishes more acceptably between suicidal acts and nonsui-
cidal acts than the mere “intention to die” does. This might
be the case of martyrs, for example. For them death is cer-
tainly intentional but cessation of suffering seems to over-
come the intention to die. In fact, martyrs may want to pro-
voke the cessation of suffering of the group of individuals
to which they belong (and of themselves or both). In addi-
tion, martyrs may intend to achieve some greater good by
saving other lives.
Similarly, though death may be intentional, in some sui-
cides this is not necessarily the case. Often, suicidal acts
are a frantic attempt at improving one’s life, not ending it
(Mayo, 1992; Shneidman, 1981). Nonfatal suicidal acts in
particular highlight the irrelevance of intent to die, though
we argue here that these acts should still be classified as
suicidal. For example, suicidal acts/gestures and attempts
are undertaken with the intention to stop some unbearable
situation. Death is not usually intended, but may be a con-
sequence of the action. If intent to die was the criteria for
determining suicide, then this would make such deaths ac-
cidental; this is, however, not in line with the common us-
age of the term suicide (Mayo, 1992).
Suicidal intent included as a definitional element of sui-
cide makes conceptual and theoretical sense, and is perhaps
regarded as the defining factor of suicidal acts. To remain
useful, however, the constituents of a definition must be
operationalizable. Intentions have proven difficult to con-
cretize or quantify as a consequence of their interpretive
nature and vagueness (Devries, 1968). Determining the in-
tentions behind suicidal action requires a psychological as-
sessment, which officials involved in certifying death are
not typically trained to conduct. Furthermore, other parties,
such as relatives or friends, are not always willing or avail-
able to provide the required information (O’Carroll, 1989).
Correlates such as the lethality of the act or the method
employed are frequently used to imply intent to die in the
absence of appropriate measures. Since these are not al-
ways reliably associated or highly correlated with intent,
these often prove inadequate and this practice of assump-
tion compounds the error (Linehan, 1997).
In the context of the overt characteristics only, the mean-
ing of the behavior often remains unclear. Intention places
suicidologists in a quandary: It is a necessary element of
suicide, without which the behavior would be classified as
accidental, but the problems of realizing this concept seem
insurmountable. Despite this, an “absence of evidence is
not evidence of absence” (Rosenberg et al., 1988,
pp. 1446), and to omit intent from a definition of suicide is
to leave out a crucial part of the definition. Such an omis-
sion would have dire consequences, for example, in a re-
search setting where an omission of assessment of suicidal
intent can lead to unacceptable levels of heterogeneity
among subjects (Linehan, 1997).
For suicide to be intentional, it implies an awareness (or at
least the expectation) of the potentially lethal consequences
(Rosenberg et al., 1988). It is this consciousness that distin-
guishes between a person who deliberately jumps off a bridge
knowing that it will most likely end fatally, and another who
flings themselves off a bridge in the midst of a psychotic
episode. The definitions used in the WHO/EURO Multicen-
tre Study (see above) include a number of important ele-
ments, particularly that the action is deliberate and the indi-
vidual is consciously aware of their behavior (Bille-Brahe et
al., 1995). The rationalist perspective of a conscious act is
also included in the definitions proposed by Durkheim
(1897/1951) and Shneidman (1985). This awareness and un-
derstanding of potential death excludes cases such as the
mentally retarded, many of those affected by psychosis, and
others who do not fully comprehend the consequences of
their actions.
Taken together, the arguments supporting the inclusion
of intent in a definition of suicide are strong and the prob-
lems of operationalization are outweighed by the impor-
tance of the concept. This measurement difficulty may be
alleviated by the use of established measurement tech-
niques and scales. These include Beck’s Suicide Intent
Scale for assessing intent in nonfatal suicidal behavior
(Beck et al., 1974), and employing retrospective indexes
(e.g., Jobes et al., 1987) or, in the case of fatal suicidal acts,
by psychological autopsies. For researchers and clinicians
it is also important to take into account the intention to
cease suffering in addition to the traditionally measured
intention to die, and to measure other interrelated factors
such as awareness of potential death, and previous suicidal
ideation, which can provide further clues to presence of
intent. Thus, intentions can be accepted as a central aspect
of suicide.
Suicide may represent the solution to a problem, or a
way to achieving a particular outcome. For example,
among the definitions cited in Table 1, Baechler (1980,
pp. 74) states that suicide “seeks and finds the solution to
an existential problem,” Shneidman (1985, pp. 203) asserts
that the suicidal individual “defines an issue for which sui-
cide is perceived as the best solution,” while the Working
Group for the WHO/EURO Multicenter Study (1986) de-
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fines parasuicide as “aimed at realizing changes which the
subject desired” (but the same concept is expressed in the
suicide definition).
The death attained by suicide is a means to an end, not
necessarily an end in itself. As eloquently outlined by
Baechler (1980), death is not viewed by the potential sui-
cide as a voluntary choice, but as the only option available
that would provide a change to the current, unaffordable
situation. It is, thus, not appropriate to define the act as
willful or as desired. Had the individual perceived other
available solutions, the situation would not have resulted
in an attempt on the life of the individual, or in their death.
Clearly, these considerations need to be seen in the perspec-
tive of the individual who takes suicidal action, who feels
that a choice has to be made among (almost) equally un-
wanted alternatives.
The definitions of parasuicide and suicide proposed by
the WHO Working Group have been criticized because of
their use of the wording “desired changes.” In light of what
was discussed above, we might then propose a partial re-
phrasing of it by substituting “wanted” for “desired” (see
below), which is both semantically and conceptually more
supportive of most interpretations.
This minor adaptation seems to be quite close to Shneid-
man’s concept of “best solution” (1985), and at the same
time it better emphasizes the situation of coercion that sui-
cidal individuals face in their fatal dilemma. However,
more than 15 years from its initial formulation (1986), the
WHO/EURO definition of suicide still retains its validity
by possessing all fundamental requirements of a modern
enunciation: Responsibility, awareness of the potential le-
thality of the act, intention to die/provoke those changes
that the subject is assumed to prefer to living conditions
otherwise perceived as unbearable.
In conclusion, after reconstructing all developmental
stages and rationales that guided the choices made in con-
structing the definition of suicide, we are incline to repro-
pose – slightly modified – a quite similar enunciation:
“Suicide is an act with fatal outcome, which the deceased,
knowing or expecting a potentially fatal outcome, has initiated
and carried out with the purpose of bringing about wanted
changes.”
The addition of “potentially” (fatal outcome) is another dif-
ference from the 1986 WHO/EURO definition. It is intend-
ed to encompass those cases in which an individual, with
ambivalence or wanting to influence others, takes the risk
of death in a suicide attempt and dies. His/her intention to
die was not strong, and the attempt might have ended in
survival as well, depending on coincidental factors, but
death is instead the outcome. Similar cases are actual sui-
cides, but a proper categorization through the previous def-
inition can be quite problematic. The case of risk-taking in
extreme sports or stunts remains excluded from this defi-
nition, because this behavior is not aimed at bringing about
changes.
Toward a Nomenclature for Suicidal
Behavior
The first step in expanding our definition to form a working
nomenclature for suicidal behavior is to clarify precisely
the role and characteristics of a successful set of terms and
definitions. Addressing the intricacies of an area is not the
role of a nomenclature for suicide. As outlined by O’Car-
roll et al. (1996), a nomenclature forms the basis for, but is
distinct from, appropriate classification. This is an impor-
tant distinction because unlike a classification system, a
nomenclature for suicide does not aim to be exhaustive or
to precisely mirror reality; the aim is communication, util-
ity, and understanding.
Figure 1 summarizes the nomenclature we are propos-
ing. The key terms are written in bold and become more
specific as more elements are introduced. This progression
of specificity can be traced visually, from left to right. Sim-
ilar to the process followed in arriving at our definition for
fatal suicidal behavior, the most logical starting point is the
observation of the main outcome, that is, if the subject is
alive or dead. Then, we need to establish that the behavior
was self-initiated, and finally intention to die or stop living
is introduced to complete the set of terms.
Lethality may be defined as the medical probability that
a behavior, state, or means will end fatally (Maris et al.,
2000). In relation to suicidal behavior, lethality (or the
physical outcome of the act) relates to the probability of
suicidal death or, what Shneidman (1981) terms the “death-
fulness” of the act.
There are a number of important limitations in the phys-
ical outcome approach that should be considered before we
apply this as a criterion for the expansion of our definition.
First, the medical seriousness of suicidal acts does not nec-
essarily relate to the definition or meaning of the behaviors.
This implies that irrespective of differences in the physical
consequences, or the dangerousness of the behavior, fatal
and nonfatal suicidal behavior are closely related. The core
concepts introduced above, that is, responsibility, aware-
ness, and intention, are definitive across the entire spectrum
of suicidality; in this sense the outcome of the suicidal be-
havior (death vs. life) may be irrelevant. Exemplary of this,
and in this case de-emphasizing the centrality of physical
consequences, is the inclusion of “aborted suicide at-
tempts” as a category of nonfatal suicidal behavior. Abort-
ed suicide attempts are those in which an individual comes
close to enacting a suicidal behavior but does not complete
the act and, hence, sustains no injury (Barber et al., 1998).
Suicidal acts where the individual suffers injury and those
where the individual aborts the act prior to implementation
may be highly associated, particularly in terms of the intent
to die (Barber et al., 1998). It, thus, appears that the main
characteristics of suicidality remain, despite the outcome
of the act.
Second, outcome is often positioned as synonymous with
the intentions associated with suicide, most notably the sui-
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cidal individual’s intention to die. The asserted premise of
including lethality of the act in our definitions of suicidal
behavior is typically that we can infer some kind of meaning
based on these overt characteristics, but this is not necessarily
appropriate. For example, can more intent be ascribed to an
individual who jumped off a 2nd floor balcony and sustained
injuries that were not life-threatening, compared to an indi-
vidual who escaped an attempt unscathed, having been
coaxed off a 20th-story building ledge prior to jumping? In-
tent is only one associated factor and there are a number of
varied characteristics that lethality may depend on, including
gender, preparation, and knowledge about and access to
means. Hence, it is not necessarily true that fatality of at-
tempts correlate with an intent to die (Arffa, 1983; Silverman
& Maris, 1995). Rather than defining the meaning of lethality
to suicidal behavior, the confusion of outcome and intent in-
stead serves to undermine the importance of the outcome of
the act. As a result, it is important to recognize that outcome
and intent are not perfectly associated.
There are two arms to any working nomenclature: Def-
initions and terminology (O’Carroll et al., 1996). Through
the combination of these two elements, this nomenclature
appears to relate each of the key aspects that define suicide.
The remaining terms in Figure 1 expand on this definition
through the specification of the possible presence of inju-
ries that, for taxonomic purposes, might be further distin-
guished in external/visible, or internal/nonvisible (e.g., in-
toxication).
The proposed nomenclature encompasses the entire
spectrum of suicidal behaviors. As a matter of fact, three
broad outcomes may be identifiable: Fatal Suicidal Behav-
ior, Nonfatal Suicidal Behavior with injuries, and Nonfatal
Suicidal Behavior without injuries.
Following the suggestion of O’Carroll et al. (1996), in-
tention to die or stop living is quantified here as any degree
that is greater than zero. This acknowledges both the am-
bivalence in suicidal behavior and the concurrent impor-
tance of other intentions to suicidal acts.
Simplicity is an advantage of this nomenclature. The set
of terms used centers around the least possible number of
distinguishing components, that is, outcome, responsibility,
and intent. Furthermore, the progression of terms in the no-
menclature is logically organized and consistent. This pro-
motes effortless and, therefore, widespread use, which goes
a long way toward meeting the aims of understanding and
communication. Importantly, this simplicity also contributes
to ensuring a culturally normative set of terms, one that is not
grounded in a single theoretical perspective. This nomencla-
ture meets the majority of practical needs, and a parsimonious
use of terms and definitions may help to promote the inter-
disciplinary communication that is so crucial to suicidology.
As said in the introductory section, the staff of emergency
wards will probably continue to be more interested in the
physical consequences of a suicidal behavior than in the
ascertainment of the intention to die possibly involved in
the act. On the other hand, intention(s) will remain (forev-
er) exposed to deliberate denial or exaggeration. However,
promoting the culture of investigating in deeper detail at-
tempted suicide cases constitutes, in our view, a very
worthwhile effort. Not only may it improve our under-
standing of suicidal behavior, but it could also positively
affect the entire aftercare process.
Conclusions
The acceptance of a consistent definition and terminology
for suicide and suicidal behaviors appears to be the most
Figure 1. Flow chart of fatal and nonfatal suicidal behavior.
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applicable and usable solution to the definitional challeng-
es facing suicidologists. Following detailed consideration
of these problems, particularly as they manifested in the
course of the WHO/EURO Multicenter Study on Suicidal
Behavior, we considered elements that are important to a
usable definition for suicide. This definition was then ex-
panded to form a more complete nomenclature for suicidal
behavior. This clearly implies the abandonment of the sup-
port given at the beginning of the WHO study to the term
“parasuicide.” Its over-inclusive character has generated
misleading interpretations and erroneous utilizations in dif-
ferent settings, nationally and internationally. In 1994 we
suggested the interchangeability of the terms parasuicide
and attempted suicide. Together with “deliberate self-
harm” and “deliberate self-poisoning,” we are now propos-
ing for them the comprehensive category of “non-fatal sui-
cidal behavior, with or without injuries.” A consequent def-
inition could be the following:
“A nonhabitual act with nonfatal outcome that the individual,
expecting to, or taking the risk to die or to inflict bodily harm,
initiated and carried out with the purpose of bringing about
wanted changes.”
The acceptance and implementation of these terms and def-
initions may contribute to a solution of some of the prob-
lems that are associated with the assortment of terms and
definitions currently used to describe suicide and related
behaviors. We hope, too, that the proposed solution may
advance the thoughtful and challenging debate that has thus
far characterized this important and multidisciplinary field
of interest. Beyond the tower of Babel . . . or before?
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